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In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Tennessee recently ruled in Heather Smith v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee that the right to petition in Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution does not provide a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in Tennessee because that provision does not apply to private employers. This case concerned the termination of Heather Smith, an at-will employee, who was dismissed after she sent emails to Tennessee legislators expressing her grievances about her employer's COVID-19 vaccination mandate.
Background
Heather Smith began her employment with BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee in January 2014. In August 2021, amidst the global COVID-19 pandemic, BlueCross implemented a policy requiring public-facing employees to be vaccinated. Although Smith was not in a public-facing role, her employer expected her to follow the mandate because she was a leader within the organization. Smith sought a religious accommodation, which her employer denied. She then changed to a different position at her company that was not subject to the vaccination requirement.
Afterward, her employer revised the policy to mandate all employees receive COVID-19 vaccinations, and she continued to express her opposition to the mandate by emailing state legislators. One of the legislators read her email aloud to a legislative committee, and another forwarded her email to her employer. Her employer then terminated her employment for violations of its social media policy. Smith filed a lawsuit against BlueCross, claiming retaliatory discharge and arguing that her termination violated her right to petition under Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court dismissed her complaint, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
Analysis
The question presented to the Tennessee Supreme Court was whether the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution could serve as a basis for a public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in a retaliatory discharge action against a private employer. Tennessee has long recognized that a violation of a clear public policy may give rise to an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, which must be evidenced by an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision. The Court undertook a thorough analysis of the historical context of the right to petition, noting its origins as a protection against government oppression rather than a constraint on private parties.
The Court examined similar provisions in other state constitutions and found that most states do not enforce the right to petition against private entities. The Court also considered the text of Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution, which does not explicitly limit its application to government actions, but it also does not mandate its enforcement against private parties.
Decision and Implications
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution is enforceable only against governmental entities and not private parties. Consequently, private employers do not violate a clear public policy by terminating employees for exercising the right to petition. Thus, the right to petition under the Tennessee Constitution does not serve as an
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in Tennessee.
This ruling has significant implications for the employment-at-will doctrine in Tennessee. It reinforces the principle that constitutional protections, such as the right to petition, are primarily safeguards against government actions and do not extend to private employment relationships. This decision highlights the narrow scope of the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, emphasizing that it cannot be expanded to include constitutional rights that are not explicitly enforceable against private entities.
Notably, Justice Campbell issued a concurring opinion joining the majority opinion in full, but she wrote separately to question whether the Supreme Court is the appropriate entity to create public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. She reasoned that various, seemingly analogous public policies have led to divergent results, and she explained that courts are not well-equipped to determine which public policies are sufficiently clear and important to warrant the strong remedy of a retaliatory discharge claim. Recognizing that the Tennessee General Assembly has already enacted various statutes that dictate certain situations give rise to
retaliatory discharge claims, she reasoned that the Court should consider in the future whether determination of public policy exceptions should be left to the General Assembly. Whether the majority of the Court adopts Justice Campbell’s reasoning in a future case—even in a different area of the law—is something to monitor.
The decision in Heather Smith v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee highlights the importance of understanding the limits of constitutional protections in the context of private employment. While the right to petition is a fundamental aspect of democratic governance, this ruling clarifies that it does not provide a basis for claims of retaliatory discharge against private employers. This case shows that employment-at-will remains a bedrock of Tennessee law.
